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Abstract. There is a growing interest in attempting to study 
cognitive and social phenomena under the umbrella of "complex 
theory". We are indeed immersed in so-called "complex 
systems", but we are still a long way from a clear understanding 
of the concepts and principles that underlie the "complexity 
thinking" [1]. The purpose of this paper to provide a simple (and 
too short) conceptual framework to understand the basic ideas 
that allow us to think and speak of complexity in the context of 
PERPLEXUS as a physical substratum for the embodiment of 
questions related to cognition (individual and/or social) and the 
material realization of philosophical thought-experiments. To do 
so, we will notice the controversies concerning the very 
existence of such a thing as a "theory of complexity". We also 
will capture some features that can be considered as 
characterizations (or fingerprints) of "complexity thinking" by 
contrasting them with a classical Cartesian-Newtonian mode of 
thinking. Then, we will stress the key role of embodiment as a 
necessary ingredient to be incorporated in the explanatory efforts 
of different domains dealing with cognition, development and 
evolution. We will finally explain how the platform 
PERPLEXUS can represent such an ideal locus1for reformatting 
and tackling conceptual and philosophical questions grounded in 
aspects of complexity and embodiment.23 
 
1 COMPLEXITY : A THEORY ? 
Does a "theory of complexity" really exist, or is this expression 
just a label for a collection of disparate methodologies ? The 
concept of complexity is often linked today with network 
science, and researchers wonder if a comprehensive theory with 
a steady ontological, epistemological and methodological foot is 
genuinely here. For some, despite its early commercial 
successes, it will take decades to bring to full fruition what 
network science provides for an understanding of complexity. 
For example, Barabasi expressed in 2005 his opinion that: 
"Despite the necessary multidisciplinary approach to tackle the 
theory of complexity, scientists remain largely 
compartmentalized in their separate disciplines. Can they find a 
common voice ?"4. It is a patent fact that "complexity science" 
(as it is sometimes called) uses in its practical applications both 
an impressive set of very specialized and technical formalisms 
(non-linear differential equations, difference equations, networks 
clustering algorithms, computer simulations to name a few) and 
less operational, more heuristic guiding principles crystallized in 
expressions such as "edge of chaos", "emergence" and so on. 
These ideas have intricate acquaintance with a myriad of others 
notions such as, higgledy-piggledy: levels of explanation, self-
organization, non-linearity, bifurcation, phase transition, fractal, 
determinist chaos, attractor, dissipative structure, catastrophe, 
etc., that can make one's head spin. Confronted with the plethora 
of concepts and terminologies from different disciplines and 
facing the multiplicity of specific tools and techniques for 
managing "complex systems" (from now on CS), one could 
legitimately wonder if it is possible to claim for the existence of 
a unified theory of complexity. De facto, an "emerging science 
of complexity" lacks integrated theoretical foundations. In 
everyday parlance, the expression "CS" is often used to describe 
an entity that is composed of many interacting parts or 
components whose structure and behaviour are just plain hard to 
explain, but even in the systems analysis literature where the 
adjective 'complex' is ubiquitous, one can find very little to 
indicate what an author really has in mind when using this 
terminology. To Casti's eyes for example, the fact is that 
everyone seems to understand complexity until it is necessary to 
define it: "In short, we can't really define what we mean by a CS 
even though we know one when we see it"[2].  
                                                 
                                                                               
Since the question of what constitutes the essence of a CS seems 
difficult to pin down, Casti thinks that there are actually several 
facets to the complexity issue depending on the problem, the 
analyst, the questions being investigated, etc. The pursuit of a 
viable theory of complexity should take into account theses 
different facets. We can first discern static complexity which 
includes inter alia the aspects of hierarchical structure, of 
connective patterns, of variety of components and of strength of 
interactions, from dynamical complexity which considers the 
issues that arise in connection with a system's dynamical motion 
or behaviour. The different mathematical tools for these aspects 
are not always naturally related (or even compatible with each 
other). This is even more the case as soon as we turn to 
computational complexity which has been approached from 
different angles too, for example in terms of the size in bits of 
the shortest program for calculating a binary string (or by 
extension any digitizable object/phenomenon) in the context of 
algorithmic theory of information by Kolmogorov-Chaitin [3], or 
in terms of logical depth by Bennett [4]. These two ways of 
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approaching complexity are associated with two different 
conceptions of emergence. The former is concerned with 
synchronic emergence which refers to the identification at a 
given time of a property present at a given level of a system such 
as the phenomenon of face recognition; this kind of emergence is 
associated with a sudden drop of descriptive complexity which 
allows for a much more concise description of the explanandum 
than its constituent parts, and which is interpreted in terms of 
compressibility of information. The latter has to do with 
diachronic emergence and concerns systems which undergo a 
process of evolution such as cellular automata where a property 
(or a pattern, or an object) is considered as emergent if the only 
way to predict it consist in simulating/running the system by 
unfolding the scenario of its trajectory from the basic atomic 
rules deterministically governing its constituent parts. No 
shortcut possible. This diachronic notion of emergence is 
obviously illustrated by the increasing degree of 
complexification of natural entities by the incremental, 
continuous gradual process of evolution by natural selection. 
Our common-sense understanding of the world alongside with 
an impressive set of successful scientific models since the advent 
of modern philosophy and science rely on a classical or 
Cartesian mode of thinking which is expressed in its most vivid 
form by Newtonian physics. The ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of this paradigm that have 
dominated the scientific view of the world for centuries are -inter 
alia- a strong representationalist, objectivist, rationalist theory of 
knowledge which basically establishes a one-one 
correspondence between the world and our representations of it. 
Descartes famously codified a top-down notion of analysis 
consisting in a "divid ut regnat" strategy for conducting reason 
and seeking truth in sciences via his four principles in his 
Discours de la Méthode: (1) "never to accept anything as true if I 
did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to 
avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions"; (2) "to divide 
each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as 
possible"; (3) "to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by 
beginning with the simplest and most easily known objects in 
order to ascend little by little… to knowledge of the most 
complex"; and (4) "throughout to make enumerations so 
complete and reviews so comprehensive, that I could be sure of 
leaving nothing out". According to this methodological canon, in 
order to provide a discursive and rational explanation of a 
phenomenon, one embraces the idea that a whole is a linear 
combination of its parts, an idea which can be formulated in 
different idioms such as "superposition" or "compositionality 
principle".  
Many measures of complexity have been proposed for different 
contexts. However, there is no universal measure that would 
allow us to establish the degree of complexity of an arbitrary 
system. Again, each aspect of these distinctions (static, dynamic, 
computational aspects, …) can be served by different 
formalisms. The moral is, therefore, that complexity is a 
multipronged concept that must be approached from several 
direction keeping in mind the objectives of the analysis. A 
phenomenon or a system is never universally complex (or 
complex per se, or complex in an absolute sense). It is complex 
only in some respects, but not in others. This makes complexity 
a relative concept, and we now are ready to look in more details 
some of its constitutive facets, and thus, by first setting the 
classical Cartesian-Newtonian stage from which complexity 
thinking detaches itself. 
 
2 TWO PARADIGMS 
 
Based on the above considerations, one can think that a good 
way of getting a general understanding of complexity thinking is 
to clarify its principles and concepts by contrasting them with 
the traditional Cartesian-Newtonian way of thinking. Let's start 
with a coarse-grained and somewhat caricatural list of 
contrasting features to then select some of them for further 
discussion. Firstly, a caveat: we have to keep in mind that this 
prosthetic list is non-exhaustive, b) that the concepts in each 
column could be grouped differently, and c) that the columns 
could be "confronted" differently: 
Classical thinking Complexity thinking 
Objectivist theory of knowledge 
- Strong representationalism - 
"Naïve" realism 
Top-down analytical approach 
Reductionism - Isolationism  
Determinism - Predictability 









Interactionism – Modularity - 
Emergentism 
Unpredictability - Non-
linearity – Loopyness 
Bounded Rationality 
Decentralisation, distribution, 
parallelism, locality  
Self-organization, adaptation, 
flexibility robustness, … 
These principles, when applied to physics, led to the Newtonian 
materialistic ontology comprising only matter, absolute space 
and time in which matter moves, and the forces or natural laws 
that govern these movements; apparently different phenomena 
are merely different arrangements of separate pieces of matter, 
of elementary particles ruled by the strict law of cause and 
effect, leaving no place for intentional, purposeful action unless 
extended, as Descartes did it, by dualistically postulating an 
independent category of res cogitans completely isolated from 
res extensa. Moreover this reductionist and indefeasibilist way of 
conceiving a top-down analysis deflates drastically (if not 
completely) the role played by the interactions between 
components at the same and different levels of the hierarchical 
structure of the system under study. The traditional scientific 
method based on analysis, isolation and the gathering of 
complete information about a phenomenon is in no position to 
capture interdependencies between the component parts of an 
assemblage. Here, what has been called "the laws of nature" 
deterministically explain both the future trajectory of the system 
and the path it has taken in the past, implying its predictability 
and explanation via reversibility. This strict causal determinism 
finds its standard expression with Laplace in his Essai 
Philosophique sur les Probabilités: "We may regard the present 
state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its 
future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all 
forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of 
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough 
to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single 
formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would 
be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present 
before its eyes". Of course, this fondationalist, rationalist view of 
the universe where an epistemic Übermench such as Laplace's 
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demon can be conceived clashes completely with the "bounded 
rationality" philosophy of the complexity thinking, where no 
exhaustive knowledge is at the disposal of faillibilist agents 
limited in resources and local information, and who have to find 
good-enough solutions in real-time. 
Emancipating itself from this classical paradigm, complexity 
thinking manifests other "fingerprints" and adopt a set of 
different and often opposite ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. The conception of knowledge as passive reflection 
of the world has not only been questioned in physics by quantum 
mechanics, relativity theory and by other duality and 
indeterminacy principles, but also in formal domains such that 
the foundations of mathematics via formalist or other intuitionist 
programs and their extensions in verificationist theories of 
meaning for natural languages. The ontological view of a reality 
per se, as a sort of pure given expecting to be labelled, and the 
epistemological view of an objective, observer-independent 
knowledge have been also challenged by numerous 
developments in cognitive sciences [5] under the general 
philosophy of constructivism whose motto is best expressed by 
logician and philosopher Nelson Goodman: "The world is many 
ways"; cybernetics, biology and embodied cognition have 
equally shaken the commitment to naïve realism by showing that 
knowledge is a coevolutionary affair between the knowing 
subject and the "object", the result of an interactive constructive 
loop where both pole of the relation co-specify each other. This 
constitutes a major departure from the reflection-correspondance 
view of  Newtonian epistemology for which the task of science 
is to refine as much as possible the mapping between the 
external "reality" and the structures that represent it, be they 
systems of concepts, images or whatever symbols; in the limit, 
this mapping should eventually result in a perfect and objective 
representation of a pre-existing and independent reality, the same 
for all observers, the understanding of which should be perfect, 
infallible, reversible and predictable. 
As a corollary of this departure from classical reductionism, a 
recurrent signature of the complexity thinking is, then, the notion 
of interactionism inducing emergent macroscopic entities -be 
they properties, objects, processes…a handy general term could 
be "patterns"- that are non-mystical outcomes resulting from 
microscopic interactions. The idea is often illustrated by 
everyday tap water whose properties of being a liquid and non-
combustible are emergent properties arising from the interactions 
of the hydrogen and oxygen "agents" which are both highly 
flammable gases. We can note at this point that ideas advanced 
by Conway and Wolfram to avoid a subjective understanding of 
the concept of emergence consist in showing that there is no 
shorter path allowing a knowledge of the state of a cellular 
automata in the future (say after 1000 iterations of the rules) 
otherwise that the effective applications of their rules; this 
diachronic characterisation can be formulated more rigorously 
but, for Wolfram, it suffices to operationalize a subjective notion 
of emergence rooted in surprise and/or epistemic-cognitive 
limitations of the observers.  
This naturally leads to the fact that the behaviours of CSs are to 
be understood holistically, i.e. that the global manifested 
behaviours are the outcome of the multiplicity of its interacting 
parts whose contributions cannot be detected when taken in 
isolation. For example, a protein is formed as a chain of amino 
acids; this one-dimensional sequence of amino acids, strung 
together like beads on a necklace, specifies how it folds up into a 
unique three-dimensional configuration that determines its 
function in the living organism. But it is simply not possible to 
see how a protein will fold by cutting it at various spots to see 
how these sub-chains of amino acids fold, and then cementing 
together somehow the solutions of these individual sub-
problems. It must be studied as a single, integrated whole. 
Relationships between sub-systems turn the whole into a 
coherent organization with its own identity and autonomy. 
Actually, the Latin root "complexus", which means something 
like "entangled, entwined, embraced" analytically contains the 
idea of components being both distinct and connected, both 
autonomous and to mutually dependent. Complete dependence 
would imply order like in a crystal, and complete independence 
would imply disorder, like in a gas where the state of one 
molecule gives one no information whatsoever about the state of 
the other molecules. Etymology indicates us that it is  the 
relations weaving the parts together that turn a system into a 
complex one, producing emergent properties. Contrary, then, to 
a complicated TV set whose global functioning can be 
understood by dissecting it and analyzing its component parts 
dedicated to one specified function (signal detection, 
image/sound separation, amplification, etc.), the components of a 
CS do not implement functions which are totally independent.  
That is what Simon [6] has called the property of near 
decomposability. Near decomposability is a property of a CS, 
and is two-fold: first, it says that the interactions between sub-
systems in a complex system are weaker than the interactions 
within them (one can think of how interactions between 
employees in a department are much more frequent than 
interactions between employees of different departments); 
second, it says that each sub-system in a decomposed system is 
almost autonomous, meaning that each is independently 
functional and useful, but still provides value to the overall 
system by maintaining a weak connection with it. This kind of 
near decomposability is reflected in the object-oriented 
philosophy of programming where loose coupling and 
encapsulation methods are applied. Thus, CSs can be seen as 
hierarchical nested structures at different levels of analysis, and 
what is described as complex at a given level can be understood 
as a simple component at a higher level. Interactions between 
such super-systems (that can be seen as agents at the higher 
level) may recursively produce systems at even higher 
hierarchical levels, and are a major cause of their 
unpredictability.  
This fingerprint of unpredictability of CSs has been largely 
popularized under the slogan "butterfly effect" and related 
concepts such as the sensibility to initial conditions, phase 
transitions, bifurcations, etc. The common-sense motto "more is 
different" captures intuitively here the idea that sudden 
unpredictable new qualitative behaviours can happen once a 
threshold or a critical mass has been attained. Here, non-linear 
dynamics and statistical mechanics are the roots of the 
complexity thinking for dealing with randomness and chaos. The 
fact that there can be a non-proportional relation between cause 
and effect can be partly explained by the concept of interaction 
discussed above: an action induced by a component can cause 
multiple effects in different parts of the system, and some of 
these causal chains can close in on themselves. This creation of 
feedback loops will then either amplify small fluctuations to 
provoke eventually large global effects by positive feedback, or 
they can drive and maintain the system in a controlled state 
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assuring a homeostasis in viable limits by negative feedback, as 
illustrated by the functioning of a thermostat. Feedback-
regulation allows for the emergence of goal-oriented or 
teleological behaviours that are often describe as being 
intentional from the outside observer.  
3 OTHER FINGERPRINTS  
This loopyness is at the heart of a property which is often 
considered as the hallmark of complexity, namely self-
organization [7]: CSs spontaneously organize themselves so as 
to better cope with various internal and external perturbations, 
assuring by this their robustness. Fault-tolerance and damage-
tolerance make them flexible and guaranty a certain autonomy 
and adaptability in front of changes of the environment in which 
they are inserted. No external organizer is required for this 
organization. Biologists such as Varela and Maturana have 
discussed at length this kind of autonomy, this "autopoiesis" and 
this functional interdependence in terms of interactive loop or 
co-determination between a biological system and its 
environment/ecological niche. "Order for free" is Kaufmann's 
slogan for explaining the fact that the property of self-
organization can dispense with a notion of an intentional 
designer. Self-organization can be accelerated by exposing the 
system to random perturbations, making it visit its state space so 
that it will reach sooner a state that belongs to an attractor, e.g. 
the shaking of a pot filled with beans will make them explore a 
variety of configurations tending to settle into the one that is 
most stable, i.e. where they are packed most densely near the 
bottom of the pot, normally reducing their volume. Cyberneticist 
von Foerster and thermodynamicist Prigogine called this process 
respectively "order though fluctuations" and "order from noise". 
This innovative, creative process of self-organization by which 
the system arranges its components and their interactions into a 
global structure that tries to maximize its overall fitness without 
the need of a dedicated controller can be seen as a process of 
adaptation when we focus on the relations the system has with its 
environment: whatever the pressures imposed by it, the system 
will adjust to cope with them. So, evolution can be viewed as the 
self-organization of an ecosystem into a network of mutually 
adapted species, and natural self-organization can serve as bio-
inspiration as it is the case for genetic and ants algorithms.  
This naturally drives us to another directly related fingerprint of 
complexity, namely the idea of decentralization as vividly 
illustrated by the decentralized activities of pheromones trails 
constructions, pigment cells differentiation, fireflies 
synchronization, applause-bis synchronization, swarm 
intelligence, etc. There is a feeling of an "invisible hand", one 
could say, when we witness at a high level of description of a 
phenomenon the emergence of global patterns which are the 
outcome of the local properties of the constituent parts without 
any central organizing force orchestrating the whole process. 
Decentralized systems are numerous in nature, and one of the 
distinctive traits of complexity thinking is the abandonment of 
the "centralized mindset", i.e. the natural tendency for observer 
to postulate the existence of a cause, a leader, an organizing 
principle (you name it!) as a decisive causal factor. Complexity 
thinking reverse completely this view (the famous "argument 
from design") by adopting the order-for-free or blind-
watchmaker view. Indeed, in decentralized, self-organized CSs, 
no central control is needed for managing, piloting and 
coordinating the activities of the constituent parts, every one of 
which has only a partial and limited access to the information 
computed by the global system. Each element or agent being 
endowed only with local information, no explicit global 
description is represented in them. This distribution of 
information and of competences over the entire system, over all 
parts or agents constituting it, together with the parallel or 
asynchronous functioning of the computational resources, are of 
course the rationale of the robustness, flexibility, fault-tolerance, 
graceful degradation and other virtues of adaptability of self-
organized CSs. Local interactions of the type agents-agents, 
agents-environment, agents-agents via environment (stigmergy), 
limited accessibility to information, limited capacity for 
treatment, etc., can be seen as concepts analytically contained in 
the idea of distribution, and manifestations of the bounded-
rationality principle.  
Besides, in complexity thinking computation is substrate-neutral, 
making the ideas of functionalism and of multiple realizability 
(no Cartesian nor other forms of dualisms here) parts of its 
characterization. The Cartesian split between two ontologically 
incommensurable spheres of being, mind and matter, vanishes: 
both are particular types of relations. This idea according to 
which the material substance of a system is irrelevant to the way 
it performs its function is famously expressed in Bertalanffy's 
general systems theory [8]: living systems are intrinsically open, 
i.e. integrate and release information and energy; they therefore 
depend on an environment so that their effects can never be 
completely controlled nor predicted. This view is completely 
different from the traditional Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm in 
the sense that, ontologically speaking, the building blocks of 
reality are not to be found primarily in the Newtonian material 
particles; instead, patterns of organization, i.e. abstract relations, 
are what are common to different phenomena rather than 
common material components. Information understood as "a 
difference that makes a difference", realized on whatever 
substratum, is what counts. By making abstraction of the 
concrete substance of components, complexity thinking can 
establish isomorphisms between systems of different types, 
noting that the network of relations that defines them are the 
same at some abstract level, even though the systems at first 
sight belong to completely different domains. In this context, a 
super-system imposes a certain coherence on its components, 
meaning that the behaviour of the parts is to some degree 
constrained by the whole. This concept of "downward causation" 
points out for example that the behaviour of an individual is not 
only controlled by internal neurophysiologic criteria, but also by 
the emergent regularities of its environment, a point which is of 
crucial importance in contemporary evolutionary theory of 
culture.  
At that point of our reviewing of the fingerprints of complexity 
thinking, it is illuminating to remind ourselves of the important 
historical fact that the concept of self-organization first proposed 
and developed in the 1940s by the cyberneticists Wiener, Ashby 
and von Foerster was picked up during the 60s-70s by physicists 
and chemists studying phase transitions and other phenomena of 
spontaneous ordering of molecules and particles, and then 
extended and cross-fertilized during the 80s with the emerging 
mathematics of non-linear dynamics and chaos. Although, the 
kind of investigations of CSs practiced by physicists became 
essentially quantitative and mathematical, a tradition closer in 
philosophy with the cybernetics origins, developed in parallel 
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under the heading "complex adaptive systems" with the work of 
associates of the Santa Fe Institute for the sciences of 
complexity, among which John Holland, Stuart Kauffman, 
Robert Axelrod, John Casti, etc. This trend is more qualitative, 
draws inspiration more from biology and from the social 
sciences than from physics and chemistry. It is also strongly 
rooted in computer simulation, and promoted by that the new 
disciplines of "artificial life" and "social simulation".  
Common theoretical points of the sort (despite differences in 
terminology), characterizing the "embodied cognition 
paradigm",  will catch the eye of who scans the works of authors 
from different fields ranging from traditional philosophy 
(Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, …), psychology (Vigotsky, Piaget, 
Thelen, …), ethology (von Üxküll, Gibson, …), biology 
(Maturana, Varela, …), artificial intelligence (Winograd and 
Flores Dreyfus, …), robotics (Brooks, Brezeal, Mataric, Beer, 
Hutchins, Agre and Chapman, Cliff, Harvey, Pfeiffer, Floreano, 
Mondada, …), neurophilosophy/cognitive sciences (Churchland, 
Dennett, Clark, van Gelder…), etc.  
This underlines the key role played by spatial structures of 
interacting agents. These notions of locality, neighbourhood, 
spatial structures and other dynamical topologies are central 
ingredients of the dissemination of ideas application of 
PERPLEXUS, to which we now turn with all these fingerprints 
in mind. 
In this quarters, a generic principled formulation could be the 
following : intelligent action results in this agent-environment 
structural coupling which implies a "fuzzification" of clear-cut 
delineations between mind, body and world as well as 
perception, cognition and action. Internal world representations 
that would be complete and explicit representations of the 
external environment, besides being impossible to obtain and 
impossible to be used in real time (frame-problem), are not at all 
necessary for agents to act in a competent manner. To escape the 
frame-problem, the brain, the body and the world are united in a 
complex dance of circular causation and extended computational 
activity (and not considered any more as being clearly separated 
as in a "Sense-Model-Plan-Act" philosophy typical of a 
symbolic, a-temporal, static approach which is the typical 
signature of symbolic AI for example). Emphasis on the 
physical, environmental, sociological, cultural context reflects 
the fact that different kinds of minds develop in a given "milieu" 
and that they use the tools, the representational media, the 
cultural items, etc., provided by it to support, facilitate, extend, 
and reorganize mental-cognitive functioning. Here, the relation 
Subject-World (Agent-Environment, Individual-Ecological 
Niche, Animal- Umwelt, …) is not simply a one-way (passive) 
street, but a constructive bi-directional interaction where the 
agent is a full-blooded constructor of its own behavior and 
knowledge. The world is here, ready to be "picked-up" and full 
of connotations of activities decoded according to the needs and 
possibilities of an embodied agent. This action-centered view of 
perception is therefore also a plea for embodiment and its 
indispensable role in reducing the computational burden of 
cognitive agent.  
4 EMBODIMENT AND "ORDER FOR FREE" 
ON PERPLEXUS 
It has been extensively stressed by the robotics community that 
the synthesis of intelligent behaviour has to transcend the 
artificial-toy world of pure simulation, and to allow thereby the 
agent under study to confront its situated body with the for-ever 
unpredictable contingencies of its environment.  
A pretty-fancy program can indeed work without problems in the 
frictionless and always shining crystal-world of simulation; 
nevertheless it can, at the same time, not function at all once 
operating in the real world. The rationale for this phenomenon 
resides in the ineliminable discrepancies (at all levels of 
analysis) existing between a simulated model and its real 
instantiation-implementation : a robot may get stuck against a 
wall in simulation, whereas it can escape its temporary trap in 
reality, or vice versa. De facto, information-processing tasks that 
are confined in software abstractions are resolved in ways that 
are different from the ways employed in real wet life; for 
example, the real-world structures can be exploited on the fly by 
cognitive agents without them having a complete-exhaustive 
representation of it, neither a stock of stored artefactual 
responses to problems such us collision on the same spot : 
mobile robots will solve this problem without the need for a 
conflict resolution scheme that would be, in contrast, needed in a 
software simulation. As Brooks said in many places :  "The 
world is its own best model".  
As a fundamental and defining principle, the embodied cognition 
paradigm argues that the understanding of the different aspects 
of cognition rely on explaining them in the context within which 
the real physical agents operate. That is here that the 
interdisciplinary project PERPLEXUS [9] enters the scene as an 
unprecedented opportunity to assess questions that are not 
ideally addressed in classical computer simulation approaches 
because of the fact that software abstractions do not do justice to 
the real anchors of perception-action cycles of embodied 
cognitive social agents. The project PERPLEXUS aims to 
develop a scalable hardware platform made of custom 
reconfigurable devices endowed with bio-inspired capabilities. 
This platform will enable the simulation of large-scale complex 
systems and the study of emergent complex behaviours in a 
virtually unbounded wireless network of computing modules. At 
the heart of these computing modules, we will use a Ubichip, a 
custom reconfigurable electronic device capable of 
implementing bio-inspired mechanisms such as growth, learning, 
and evolution. These bio-inspired mechanisms will be possible 
thanks to reconfigurability mechanisms like dynamic routing, 
Although some software tools do integrate today libraries that 
mimic dynamical properties such as friction, collision, mass, 
injection of noise, gravity and inertia, etc., these discrepancies 
between simulation and reality will inevitably cumulate over 
time : it is a matter of principle that this fact (that could be 
labelled "the reality gap") is a problem that cannot be resolved 
without adopting an embodied and situated perspective.  
Apart from the increasing recognition in the artificial-
intelligence and robotics communities that the nature of the body 
significantly affects the mind, considerations for supporting an 
embodied perspective on cognition have had a long story in the 
biological, ethological, psychological, sociological and 
philosophical literature : indeed, behaviour is a dynamical 
process resulting from nonlinear interactions between the agent’s 
control system, its body, and the environment; all these features 
and the complex patterns of their interactions induce a non linear 
behavioural trajectory of agent, making its behavior 
unpredictable although fully determined.  
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distributed self-reconfiguration, and a simplified connectivity. 
Such an infrastructure will provide several advantages compared 
to classical software simulations: speed-up, an inherent real-time 
interaction with the environment, self-organization capabilities, 
simulation in the presence of uncertainty, and distributed multi-
scale simulations. 
Therefore, our agents will have "bodies" and will experience the 
world, have immediate feedback of their actions on their own 
sensations so that so that they will be part of a constructive 
dynamics with their physical environment and their changing 
social networks. Ubidules-marXbots will operate in dynamic 
environments using real sensors and effectors and will not be 
deprived of the possibilities offered by the "world" they live in. 
Embodiment will assure that they won't get caught in the frame-
problem according to which it is by essence impossible to 
specify a complete model of the world and of the up-dating of its 
modifications after applications of the operators of its dynamics. 
Our embodied societies will be constituted of adaptive agents 
living in constantly changing environments; more precisely, 
situated Ubidules riding marXbots able to interpret signals 
coming from their environment and to communicate thanks to 
their sensors/effectors equipment, will move around in their 
environment and disseminate ideas in a non predictable way as 
function of their perceptual and social biases, and of their 
constantly changing social networks (dynamical interaction and 
imitation neighbourhoods). We will profit from the marXbots' 
perceptual capacities to interact with the real environment and 
with themselves as a source of the injection of "noises" such as 
misperceptions, inherent conceptual limitations, interfered 
transmission, idiosyncratic or socially-influenced preferences to 
choose these or those (the successful, the common type, etc.) as 
targets to be imitated. 
Although our purpose here is to present the platform as an 
invitation for researchers to use it as an implementation locus for 
their own models, we propose in the following paragraphs a 
possible use of it, just to illustrate its potential exploitation. We 
think for exemple that questions related to the topics of the 
dissemination of cultural items will thus find some new 
opportunities of treatment by the use physical Ubidules-
marXbots on the real world platform PERPLEXUS. By making 
agents embodied and situated, it will be possible to explore 
aspects of the dissemination of cultural items (and to assess 
socially-philosophically-oriented questions related to it) that are 
not ideally addressed in classical computer simulation 
approaches. From a technical perspective, the embodiment of 
cultural dissemination mechanisms in a group of mobile robots 
implies a set of challenging requirement for the mobile robotic 
infrastructure itself: 1) network size: we need a sufficiently high 
network size to achieve emergence and run experiments that are 
representative for social exchanges. Therefore we need to ensure 
that experiments will involve at least 20 robots. If this number is 
not exceptional anymore in the field of collective robotics, it 
appears to be an interesting challenge when combined with the 
others requirements of our application in term of flexibility, 
monitoring and embedded features; 2) complex interface with the 
environment: the robots need a sufficient number of sensors and 
actuators to perform basic tasks combined with some social 
communication and exchange of ideas. The communication of 
ideas implies extended possibilities of expression and of 
perception. The marXbot's design is the result of a long 
experience in collective robotics, where this topic has been 
already addressed at a lower scale and exploited in the European 
projects “swarm-bots” and “ECAgents”; 3) flexibility: the 
marXbot's design is based on a modular structure allowing a 
very efficient adaptation of the functionalities of the robot and 
will provide the necessary flexibility; 4) experimentation tools: 
research in collective robotics is extremely demanding in term of 
infrastructure to efficiently run experiments, monitor and 
document them. Controlling the operational condition of 20 
robots, monitor their activity, movements and provide the 
pertinent information to the researcher is a heavy task 
demanding a specific infrastructure. The marXbot's design takes 
in account this aspect providing each robot with an onboard 
LINUX and wireless access. This allows an excellent 
accessibility to the machines both from the development and the 
experimentation perspective. The robots will be exploited in an 
arena equipped with a tracking system allowing an optimal 
monitoring of the displacements. Because of the compact size of 
the marXbot, the arena will have a reasonable size and allow a 
wide range of experiments; 4) duration of experiments: the 
systematic exploration of complex emergent phenomena will 
require experimentation on long periods of time. Energy is a 
well-known limitation in mobile robotic systems and often sets 
strong limitations in term of duration of experiments. The 
marXbot's design includes an energy management system 
allowing swapping battery during operation. This feature will be 
exploited to provide several days of autonomy to our mobile 
robotic system. 
With this set of technical features we will be able to embed into 
a robotic system a set of social interaction experiments exploring 
emergence of culture in an innovative and efficient way. But we 
insist on the fact that, from a more general point of view, in 
additional to an ideal setup for evaluation of culture 
dissemination (which is just one exploitation among many 
possible), this setup will be an optimal tool to explore ubiquitous 
computation in a dynamic network of mobile systems.   
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have explained that for some mathematicians and thinkers 
the notion of complexity, as ubiquitous as is, is nevertheless a 
multipronged concept and that a system is not complex per se, 
but deserves the predicate "is complex" only in a relative sense. 
A full-blooded, unified formalized a theory of complexity does 
not yet exists and still awaits its Pascal and Fermat. This fact 
implies that the elaboration of a decent theory of complexity 
must begin by identifying and analyzing the key components of 
the kind that we have evoked in this paper. Although humility 
must win over hubris talking about a comprehensive 
understanding of the notion of complexity, reasons for optimism 
are fuelled by an interdisciplinary pursuit towards characterizing 
these key facets of complexity, formulating organizing 
principles, making distinctions and clarifying their ontological 
and epistemological foundations in order to augment our 
awareness of its multidimensional fingerprints [10].  
We have then discussed some of these fingerprints of complexity 
thinking by contrasting it with a classical Cartesian-Newtonian 
mode of thinking. This allowed us to underline the transition 
from a mechanist and deterministic ontological and 
epistemological view to a more global and modest approach. 
This modesty hides a new ambition: crating an artificial world, 
with virtual and embodied agents/societies which manifest 
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behaviours analogous with the ones we observe in the real world 
[11]. However, computer simulations are intrinsically limited for 
capturing what the real word has to say (so to speak) concerning, 
cognitive downloading and other co-evolving agent-environment 
phenomena. PERPLEXUS represents an opportunity to gain 
insights into dynamic processes that standard mathematical 
techniques would not reveal and that computer simulations 
would not capture. As a material computational platform, it does 
overcome these kinds of limitations and can serve as a physical 
substratum for the embodiment of questions related to cognition 
(individual and/or social) and the material realization of 
philosophical thought-experiments. 
 
In this sense, PERPLEXUS will represent a unprecedented aid 
for intuition, imagination, testing as well as a major adjuvant for 
explorations of ideas concerning multi-secular conceptual and 
philosophical questions. It is our hope that the family of models 
developed so far on the pervasive computing infrastructure 
PERPLEXUS (and whose generality allows for extensions) can 
humbly serve as tools for thinking aspects of the deep and 
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